

Mr. Richard L. Haver

Richard L. Haver was born in Syracuse, New York on January 30, 1945. He moved to Summit, New Jersey in 1953 with his sister and parents. He graduated from Summit High School in 1963 and earned a B.A. degree in history from Johns Hopkins University in 1967.

He served on active duty in the U.S. Navy from 1967 to 1973. After completing the U.S. Naval Flight Officer Training Program in 1968 as a Most Distinguished Graduate, Mr. Haver served in Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron One based in Atusgi, Japan (1969 to 1971) and in the electronic Warfare Division of the Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center in Suitland (1971 to 1973).

In 1973, Mr. Haver left the active Naval Reserve to become a civilian intelligence analyst in the Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems Branch at the Naval Intelligence Support Center. In 1976, he was selected as a department head at the Navy Field Operational Intelligence Office (NFOIO) at Fort Meade, and the next year became the Technical Director of the Naval Ocean Surveillance Information Center in Suitland. He subsequently held the senior civilian position at NFOIO, serving as Technical Director until assuming the position of special Assistant to the Director of Naval Intelligence from January 1981 to May 1983. He then became the first civilian to serve as the Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. Mr. Haver held this position until June 1989.

Mr. Haver was selected by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney as the first official to hold the position of Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy in July 1989. From June 1992 to May 1995, Mr. Haver served as the Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs. Mr. Haver then headed the Ames Damage Assessment and now serves as the National Intelligence Officer for Special Activities.

Mr. Haver has received the Nielson Award for Naval Intelligence in 1974, the Department of Navy (DON) Superior Civilian Service Medal in 1980, the DON Distinguished Civilian Service Medal in 1976 and 1989, and the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Medal in 1978, 1992, and 1995. He was awarded the Central Intelligence Agency Distinguished Civilian Service Medal in 1995. In 1983, he received the Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award. In 1985 and 1991, he was given the Presidential Rank distinguished Executive Award. In 1989, 1993, and 1995, he was awarded the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

Among his other accomplishments, Mr. Haver has served as Chairman of the Fairfax County Board of Real Estate Assessment Equalization; Vice President of the Great Falls Citizens Association; President of the Hickory Creek Homes Association; and President of the Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology Colonial Boosters Club. He also serves as head coach of the Shamrocks 14 and under girls fast-pitch softball team.

Mr. Haver is married to Carol Adams of Summit, New Jersey, and they have four daughters—Kimberley, Jennifer, Sandra, and Stephanie.

Naval Intelligence and the Submarine Force

Richard Haver

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I am certainly humbled to be here today because there are many people in the audience who are actually considerably more qualified to talk on the subject of the submarine community and intelligence than I am. I think it speaks to the two fundamental points that I'd like to make.

The first one is “involved.” The submarine community has always been deeply involved in intelligence, not simply writing requirements and throwing them over the wall and expecting some story to come back a few weeks later that answered the question, but involved in the *doing* of intelligence. The point was made earlier about the original Submarine Force, seen as “scouts” for the force, etc. Certainly that’s part of their reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence process, and it’s continued up through today. The assets of the submarine community—the boats themselves and the men that man them—have always been deeply involved. It was interesting to hear ADM DeMars run down the biographies of the gentlemen in the last panel. You heard the word SPECOPs mentioned by practically every one of them during the Cold War. SPECOPs is a bit of a euphemism for “involved” in my sort of business.

And it isn’t just the platforms. If you take a look at the walls outside the office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, you see many pictures hanging there with dolphins in the picture. People like Fluckey and Harflinger and others involved in the intelligence community—Burkhalter, Giambastiani—there is a whole host of people who have been in intelligence billets while they were on active duty and were serving in positions of great responsibility in the Submarine Force as well. There are others involved, particularly in the enlisted ranks. Much of the work done in sonar, done in passive acoustics—it migrated from here down to Suitland, Maryland into the

bowels of the naval intelligence organizations. The very best sonarmen, the riders, those who went out and optimized the art of passive acoustics and narrowband and all the other things that were mentioned—they all went through various tours of duty and really became the bedrock of the entire country's acoustic intelligence capability.

The other word, other than involved, that I want to use is “put intelligence to use.” I can only use a small anecdote to highlight this because it comes from someone who has virtually nothing to do with the submarine community. It was by General Bill Odum. Lieutenant General Odum is, of course, a professional Army officer with a long career in the Army and in Army policy, a National Security Council staffer and the like. One of his last tours of duty was as the Director of NSA—the National Security Agency, a major component piece of intelligence. After about six months, I got a somewhat frantic call from some of the people working in the areas that directly supported our naval intelligence activities, particularly related to submarines, that someone needed to come out and give General Odum some perspective because he was shouting and screaming around the NSA compound, using colorful language at times, about how “those Goddamn naval officers keep using all this intelligence and nobody else does. Why are all the people who are happy wearing dolphins, and nobody else is doing anything but complaining to me about the intelligence support?”

So I was packed up in a vehicle and sent out to have a *séance* with General Odum. He did start off pretty much on the lines that the NSA people had told me that he was shouting about. When he got through explaining his problem, which was pretty much as they had described, he was shocked to find out just how pleased the Navy, and in particular the Navy Submarine Force, was with the production coming out of the National Security Agency and out of the intelligence community. He couldn't find anybody else in the military who had anything close to that level of satisfaction or appreciation for the process. Why was this? He almost had the sort of intonation that there was something sinister in this particular fact. He also had the idea that maybe his people were stressing being too comfortable and friendly with the submariners, that they had become beguiled by these personable individuals and were working too hard just to satisfy the needs of the Submarine Force for intelligence. I pointed out that while his people certainly were interested in supporting the Submarine Force, it really was the fact there were so many submariners directly involved in intelligence. They understood what it could and couldn't do better than anybody else, but most importantly his analysts working all this raw material had very little understanding of what submarining was about, just as many of his analysts working aviation problems and ground problems and strategy problems also lacked background information.

But unique to the operating forces, the submariners had chosen to do something about it, and there are many people in this room who had a part in that. They took those NSA analysts to sea with them. They brought them up here to New London and put them in attack trainers. They took them over to the Development Group, the squadron, and ran them through the program. They involved them in the process—made them certainly not submariners, but cognizant of what, in this large mound of information that these analysts had to deal with every day, was of greatest value and the most relevance to those who had to worry about how to fight submarines and win the undersea struggle. As a result, the NSA analysts responded. Armed with information, armed with knowledge, armed with awareness, they went back to their places of business and started producing information that was more relevant and immediately useful to the very people who had given them the experience.

The history of all this is, I think, very closely in parallel. In listening to this morning's presentation by Admiral Fountain and the panel, it seemed to me that if you sat a similar group

up there and talked about the evolution of the nation's intelligence capability in the post-World War II period up to the present time, they closely parallel each other. Intelligence went in two directions: it went into outer space, and it went into inner space—as Admiral Gorshkov used to call it—inner space being where we actually had warriors. We had signed treaties and established policies not to militarize outer space, so the crossover wasn't as direct from that platform or area, if you will, for collecting intelligence. But the inner space world—it was very direct.

The early days—and when I went back and looked through intelligence products of the 50's, 60's, and 70's to try to prepare this—in the 50's as this group began its existence and as we began to understand what our dilemmas and challenges were, the principal production is largely characteristics. We're measuring things: length, beam, speed, depth, noise. Weapons systems were being characterized. Order of battles were being produced. We're giving the general gist of intelligence: laying out a picture of how big it is, where it is, and in a rough sense, what it's doing. Of course, it was a growing submarine diesel force in the old Soviet Union. Then quickly upon that in the mid to late 50's, a force that turned to nuclear power and a great deal of western technology crossed over the line, and the Soviets began to speed up their development.

As you look into the 70's-60's and then 70's-intelligence evolves into more concern about operations. There's a greater level of production and attention to how forces are actually operating—how many are out, when they do things—and we start to make a much greater use of our own Submarine Force to collect this information, to go gather it, to observe it, to report it, and to give the intelligence community the ability to then collate that data and provide it to organizations like the Development Group, so that we begin to get into tactics, we begin to get into patterns of operations. The Soviet Union starts to run large exercises, starts to deploy squadrons to the Mediterranean, starts to behave more like a blue water navy than the old brown water coastal force it had been for so many years, and we start to grow up to watch it. Many people in this room are involved in the creation of the ocean surveillance information system, and I will get back to this when we talk about the present. The growth of SUBDESKS—you couldn't walk in a fleet commander's intelligence center, you couldn't walk into an ocean surveillance center without finding a SUBDESK—without finding eight or nine young officers and enlisted men and maybe a few scattered civilians, a couple of them unrestricted line officers from the submarine community serving a duty as a sub specialist in intelligence, manning the SUBDESK—reporting on a day—in, day-out basis the comings and goings, what we knew, and also very importantly, what we didn't know about how that force was operating.

It also prompted a new level of intelligence requirements being generated out of this community and also the act of participation by a large number of senior and junior officers in driving the intelligence community to satisfy those gaps, to close those information shortfalls. And the principal question was “Why?” Why do they operate the way they do? Why do we see the Soviets behave in this manner instead of that manner? The mirror image had worked for awhile, but as a result of the activities up here, the studies and analysis that were just described began to produce questions—questions that could not be answered by simply looking at the outside, by simply examining the way in which the force operated by measuring distance traveled and when turns occurred and depth changes, etc. We had to know more about why these things were done—what was the tactical benefit being sought? The pressure became quite intense, from this community in particular, to close that gap. We started thinking about ways in which we could penetrate the adversary sufficiently to get that knowledge. One of the problems with giving this brief is classification because it's very difficult to get too detailed here or specific without crossing over into areas that that quite justifiably remain in a classified area today. The Blind Man's Bluff book is not a sanctified declassification effort, I can assure you, so rather than

comment on the accuracy of it, I would simply say that some of the story line is true—the story line being that you had to get very close to this adversary, you had to penetrate this adversary in ways that this adversary didn't understand, in order to gather that information.

As we talked about the days of the 70's and 80's as a blossoming of this whole process, I'd like to think that behind some of that is a blossoming of that intelligence process, because we did come into possession in the late 70's and early 80's of a mountain of information that started to reveal why. How, why, what was the underlying thesis. The most important thing of all, and this again was crucial, I think, to the relationship between the intelligence community and the submarine community—we began to see how our adversary sees us. This is a rare opportunity not given to very many elements of the military—when you have a sufficiently deep understanding of the adversary so that you—instead of looking through a mirror at the problem, instead of supposing what it is must be governing their thoughts and their worries and fears, priorities, and where they believe they're superior—you began to see it from a factual basis, to actually understand how the other side saw us. That started to have a profound effect on how the Navy at-large thought about itself and how individual elements of the Navy, but most importantly the submarine service, saw itself and its role in a major struggle vis-à-vis the Soviet Union or in keeping the Soviet Union at bay. It took a large number of the right people to do this, and they had to be operators.

An event occurred in 1981—Admiral Watkins was still the vice chief, Admiral McKee was OP-95, Admiral Thunman was OP-02—and Admiral Hayward had a meeting up in the old D-ring spaces on the fifth deck of the Pentagon, back behind the steel vaults that many of you used to work in. He wanted a briefing on all this material and after the briefing was over he said, “What are we going to do about this? The important thing here is we now understand a lot more about why. What can we do about it?” Always quick with the answer, Admiral McKee and Watkins had the answer. They would set up a team of people who are operators to work in close coordination, almost hand-in-arm, with the intelligence activities of ONI to develop what all this meant. Admiral McKee called the team Charlie. When I asked him where team Alpha and Bravo were, he said they didn't exist but “I'd like somebody looking for them. So we'll have TEAM CHARLIE.” Typical of Admiral McKee—always looking for the hidden story. They went off and created this group, and from it came a number of things including ultimately the maritime strategy document that Linton Brooks and a number of other senior naval officers prepared in the mid 1980's. It was based on this information.

The other thing that was a critical feature of this, which I'll touch on in a minute when I talk about the future in contrast, was that despite the fact that much of this was tightly compartmented and very sensitive in terms of how we obtained it, the Navy found a way, particularly the submarine part of the Navy, to get this information out to the deck plates: out to the operators, into the classroom, into the Development Group. They did it by, in effect, wiping away “how” and providing only the “what we knew,” and doing it with the imprint of senior officer approval, the direct involvement of people like Admiral Long and the SUBLANT and SUBPAC commanders. The more junior officers, the instructors, etc., knew better—because they were submariners and part of the silent service—than to ask how we knew it. If the senior officers said, “We believe this; this is valid; take it and use it,” that's what they did with it. They converted all of that highly compartmented, highly sensitive information down into just barely “secret” or “confidential” tactical information.

It was also clear that we had to include our allies and so we went to Admiral Fieldhouse—Admiral Watkins went to his old friend Sir John Fieldhouse—and set up a parallel activity inside the Royal Navy and inside the Ministry of Defence down on Whitehall in London. In effect the

Royal Navy replicated ours. They also went to the Canadians because of their involvement in the Battle of the Atlantic and did the same thing in terms of including the Canadians in the process and getting the small Canadian force at least informed about what its role was going to be and how it fit into the larger picture.

In every case I saw, we never cleared more than about 15 to 20 people into knowing how we actually acquired the information. That was left unsaid, but we creatively—and it was primarily the operators, the naval officers who wore dolphins and understood what was important—converted that information into tactically significant data. It was done here, and many of the studies, many of the reviews that were done—Jim Patton, Virg Hill—much of the work that was put into those simulations and those evaluations was guided in the back room, if you will, behind the purple door by what was known from this intelligence material. They didn't have to push all of the classifications out there; they could simply incorporate what they knew was correct, what they knew about how the other side saw things, into those unclassified lessons that were being learned from the process. It was, to use a somewhat overused term, a very “symbiotic” structure where positive information was used to inform at the same time to protect. Of course, one of the reasons the submariners were so interested in participating is they were protecting their own. They themselves were deeply involved in the process; they knew how fragile and dangerous the acquisition of the information could be, and therefore they, as much as anyone in the intelligence community, had an obsession with protecting the sources and the methods, how this could be acquired.

In the 90's I've observed, somewhat from the sidelines as I was moved—“Peter Principled”—up through the intelligence process, that some of these lessons have gotten lost. We are not doing this job as well or as creatively as we did it ten years ago. I was just through, in the last year, the process of working with former Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld on assessing the ballistic missile threat to the U.S., and there are unclassified versions of that. You'll see that Secretary Rumsfeld had taken particular note of this obsessive classification in the community, but more than the classification and compartmentation, the fact that the information is not filtering into the system. We have lost the idea about how to operationalize the knowledge that we gain. We're allowing these stovepipes and barriers to perpetuate across the lifetime of the information. As a result national authority isn't being properly informed, and to say the least, the tactical community is not being adequately apprised of what knowledge is being gained and what the threats and problems that are evolving really are. There is a serious need to correct this problem again, to sort of reinvent the process that we already knew how to do and have lost a good deal of that lesson, to go back and restore it.

The intelligence community is also suffering from the same draw down in resources that I've heard described here this morning. If you took a look at the community today, it's 40% smaller than it was ten years ago. There were ten analysts up here working the submarine problem in 1991; only six of them are left in the community, and quite frankly, only two of them are thinking about submarines anymore. The others have gone off to worry about TOMAHAWK targeting, to worry about embassies in downtown Belgrade, etc. They aren't doing the job—I defy you to go find me the SUBDESK out there in the fleet; go find me a FOSEF or a FOSEC any longer. We've jointed all of this and in many respects the jointness of intelligence is good, bringing all these disciplines into one place. Organizing our efforts to meet a joint service need is a wise thing to do, but I am concerned that in doing it, we've lost our ability to be specific. We've lost our ability to know in detail. The reason embassies in downtown Belgrade are inadvertently hit with bombs is that you don't have someone in the system who knows downtown Belgrade as well as he knows downtown Washington. We start to diffuse our attention, we start to lose our focus, we start to make people generalists instead of specialists.

We tell them we're not quite sure what the mission is, we tell them their career is going to be based on how broad base they are—back to Admiral Fountain's question about whether we're too broad, but not deep enough.

In the intelligence community today, you're already seeing some of the results of that. There is still, I believe, a strong need to assign specific professional people to know problems in excruciating detail—to know everything there is to know about it and to not forget any of that, either what came before or what we currently are dealing with. The way in which we got a view of how the Russians, the Soviets, saw us was by understanding the Soviets in that level of detail—by understanding their personalities, not just the organizational chart—by understanding the realities of the situation, by understanding each individual ship, where it went, what it did, which ones won the battle efficiency E's of the Soviet navy, which ones flunked. When you're looking at their operations, it's always important to watch the best, because from the best you're going to find the most difficult and intractable foe, not from the one who consistently flunks his operational inspections. It wasn't until we got into the 70's—late 70's and early 80's—that naval intelligence built a cadre of people sufficiently versed in the details of this, to have that knowledge, and the operators developed a sufficiently broad based set of experts that they could become the consumers for that information. But the point is still the same. I know of no other force in the U.S. military—and I have had the advantage of being the Assistant Secretary of Defense for intelligence policy for three years for Mr. Chaney, so at least I got a taste of how all the rest of the services do it—of seeing just how extraordinary the relationship is between the Submarine Force and intelligence.

One more short sea story and that is in the early 80's, Alf Andreason, who ran the TEAM CHARLIE operation for Admiral McKee, and I were summoned down to the Air Force Chief of Staff's spaces. We were told that Admiral Watkins had beaten the Air Force Chief of Staff over the head often enough that we were going to be cleared into the STEALTH secrets. We were given polygraph examinations to make sure we were worthy, and then a young Lieutenant Colonel by the name of Paul Kaminski, who I think moved on to bigger and better things subsequently, gave us the briefing on what was, of course, the F-117 program and its predecessor and also its B-2 plans that stood beyond it. Of course, it was a very impressive presentation. Paul Kaminski is a very impressive individual with a great deal of knowledge about his program. It was very much a "how we build it, why it works." And then Paul, being a candid fellow, started talking about the Air Force's problems in figuring out how to use it—how to put this to work, what the operating doctrine needed to be, how they were out in the desert of Nevada working on those things, working on how to apply STEALTH to this aviation problem. Alf and I kept our mouths shut; we were there to listen not to interact. When we got through and walked back to the spaces up in the Navy side of the Pentagon, all we could do was say to ourselves, "What they ought to go do is talk to the DEVGROUP. They need to go talk to the submariners."

Stealth is not new; stealth is old. It's been around since Mr. Holland first decided to submerge his little ship. This is exactly where the submariners have lived for years. The only thing is we need to move from the speed of sound to the speed of light, from 25-35 knots to 650 knots. And we need to start working with missiles instead of torpedoes, but the problem is identical. For the next two years, Alf Andreason and his TEAM CHARLIE crowd worked hard with the Air Force to try to inculcate into the Air Force people working on the employment of STEALTH that the Navy submarine community had essentially gone through all the same fundamental pieces of thinking long ago. The other thing that was clear was visualization—that when we talked about this, and in particular when we looked at the Russians who were best and the Russians who were being judged by their own people to be the most effective submariners, those who could

visualize what was going on in three dimensions, those people who had a facility for understanding that without being taught—those were the people who they thought were the best. The Russians had a process as early as the late 60's in singling out who those individuals were, in testing them and going through a variety of psychological examinations, etc., and trying to identify them so that they could be earmarked for command responsibility because they were the ones who could best fight in this three-dimensional, highly sensory-dependent environment, where in many respects you're working on serendipity and working on instinct as much as you're working on solid information. You have to fill in with instinct what is missing in your sensory views. When we fed all that back, I remember Admiral McKee remarked that he'd been doing the same thing his entire life; he just hadn't quite articulated that that's what he was doing.

The intelligence community and the submarine community, I believe, have a bright future together. If I learned anything from looking at this Rumsfeld commission report, the world of tomorrow is not going to be as peaceful and benign as a lot of the leadership of the country would like to believe. What we're going to find, however, is it's likely to be highly asymmetrical. We're not dealing with adversaries who have any perception that they can challenge us toe-to-toe. We are not challengeable toe-to-toe. Rather they will try to challenge us asymmetrically, pick out where we're weak, pick out where we're unprepared, pick out where we do not have an answer to their particular brand of misery, and then they will try to visit it upon us. Whether it's terrorism, ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, biological weapons, or information warfare—those are the areas that are going to be used. I, for one, believe the undersea force has a very dramatic potential for working in those environments, in many respects beyond that which is enjoyed by other sister elements of the armed services. The question is whether we have the leadership and the vision to go out and find those applications for undersea platforms and apply it to the problem and whether the intelligence community is going to be there, as it was there in the past, with the information necessary to apply that as adroitly and intelligently as it was in the past.

With that I'd like to look to the future—it's very bright. It's only limited by our imagination. The more imaginative and creative we are, the more we're going to find the answers to that question about the relevancy of the Submarine Force. If, however, we simply look at the budget, we look at what the current leadership or requirements process says, we're going to find that is in effect a roadmap to the past, not the future.